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PROCESS-DAMAGES: NORTH DAKOTA'S EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES STATUTE HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
In 1985, Robert L. Stoner was employed as manager of Ware-
house Market, a retail grocery store owned by Nash Finch, Inc.1
Nash Finch officials investigated Stoner's alleged acceptance of
premiums offered by vendors as part of sales promotions in viola-
tion of Nash Finch policy. 2 Stoner admitted accepting the premi-
ums and was fired.3 Nash Finch officials determined the total
value of premiums Stoner had accepted over the years to be
approximately $6,000.4 Stoner had also granted a second mort-
gage to Nash Finch in the amount of $15,000, on which Stoner
owed approximately $7,500 at the time of his firing.5 In addition,
Nash Finch officials became aware that Stoner was eligible to col-
lect his accumulated profit sharing fund and that the amount in
the fund was much greater than the amount Stoner owed from
both the mortgage and the premiums. € On December 5, 1985,
company management met with Stoner and discussed the legal
actions the company might take.7 Stuart Deuring, an attorney for
Nash Finch, prepared a demand promissory note and a "Release
and Settlement Agreement," which specified the amounts of the
1. Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 749 (N.D. 1989). The 52-year-old Stoner
had been employed by Nash Finch for 17 years and was considered a valued employee. Id.
2. Brief for Appellee at 2, Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1989) (No.
880239) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. Premiums consisting of prizes, trips, appliances,
and other incentives were offered by vendors as bonuses to persuade store managers to buy
and promote the vendor products. Brief for Appellant at 4, Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446
N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1989) (No. 880239) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. The practice of
accepting premiums from vendors, although prohibited by Nash Finch through circulars
distributed throughout the company once or twice a year, was known to company
management at headquarters in Minneapolis. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 749. A secret
investigation of Stoner was conducted by Ronald Curran, a loss prevention manager for the
company. Id. Curran determined that Stoner had been accepting premiums for years, and
it was decided that Curran and Richard Wallace, Vice President of Warehouse Foods
Division, would travel to Bismarck to confront Stoner with the findings. Id.
3. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 749-50. Nash Finch decided to pursue criminal misdemeanor
charges against Stoner for theft. Id. The option of suing Stoner in a civil proceeding was
discussed but rejected as being too "time-consuming." Id.
4. Id. at 749. Included in the premiums accepted by Stoner were four trips to Hawaii
worth $800 each, which Stoner sold for cash, and an all-terrain vehicle worth $350, which
Stoner also sold for cash. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 7.
5. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 750. Nash Finch prohibited managers from keeping
premiums from vendors, because the company feared their inventory buying might be
improperly influenced. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 5.
6. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 750.
7. Id. Stuart Deuring, house counsel for Nash Finch, and Ronald Curran met with
Stoner at a Bismarck motel. Id. When Stoner was confronted by Wallace and Curran, he
expressed surprise that Wallace inquired about the acceptance of premiums, since Stoner
knew through prior discussions with him that Wallace knew that managers and other
employees of Nash Finch accepted premiums. Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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accepted premiums and the amount owed on the mortgage.8
Deuring then told Stoner that if Stoner signed the release and the
demand note and pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of theft,
the potential felony charge would not be pursued.9 Stoner signed
the demand note and the release.' 0 Immediately after the meet-
ing, Stoner and the Nash Finch officials went to the Bismarck
Police Department, where Stoner confessed to the misdemeanor
charge of theft." In January 1986, Deuring forced Stoner to
obtain a certified check to satisfy the demand note before Deuring
would deliver Stoner's profit sharing check in the amount of
$22,000.12
Stoner filed claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of pro-
cess in district court.13 The jury found for Stoner on the abuse of
process claim and awarded $25,200 in compensatory damages as
well as $200,000 in exemplary damages.' 4 Nash Finch appealed,
claiming the evidence did not support a finding of abuse of process
and alleging that the exemplary damages award was excessive, vio-
lating the excessive fines, due process, and equal protection clauses
8. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 750.
9. Id. Deuring told Stoner that the total value of all the items Stoner had accepted
would enable Nash Finch to pursue a felony charge, but that the state's attorney had agreed
to reduce the charge if Stoner cooperated. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. On December 18, 1985, Stoner was formally charged with a misdemeanor. Id.
12. Id. at 751. The demand note included the amount of the unpaid mortgage
(approximately $7,500) and the amount of premiums taken by Stoner (approximately
$6,000). Id. at 750. After the dollar amount of a video cassette recorder was crossed off the
list, the total of the demand note was $13,271.45. Id. at 750.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 753, 756-57. The compensatory damages included $200 for attorney's fees
and $25,000 for "intangible damages such as embarrassment, humiliation, mental grief, and
anguish." Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 33. Nash Finch failed to timely object to the
jury instructions regarding attorney's fees. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 753-54. Consequently,
Nash Finch waived its right to appeal the award of attorney's fees to Stoner. Id. Exemplary
damages were awarded pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-07. Id. at
756. Section 32-03-07 has been "suspended" from July 8, 1987 through June 30, 1993. Tort
Liability, 1987 N.D. Laws ch. 404 § 15. Section 32-03-07 provided, in pertinent part:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed,
the court or jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976 and Supp. 1989). The 1987 North Dakota Legislature
approved Session Law Chapter 404, which provides:
In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the
defendant has been guilty by clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud,
or malice, actual or presumed, the court or jury, in addition to the actual dam-
ages, may give damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.
1987 N.D. Laws ch. 404 § 11. The major change instituted by the Legislature is that the




of both the federal and state constitutions.' 5 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed and held that substantial evidence existed
to support the jury's finding of abuse of process and that the proce-
dure for assessment of exemplary damages did not violate the
excessive fines, due process, or equal protection clauses. 16 Stoner
v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747 (1989).
The tort of abuse of process occurs when one takes civil or
criminal legal action to accomplish a purpose different from what
the legal process is designed to accomplish."7 Recognition of the
tort of abuse of process developed because malicious prosecution
claims failed to provide a remedy for civil or criminal proceedings
that were set in motion under the proper form and with probable
cause but were aimed at satisfying a purpose for which legal proce-
dures were not designed.' This abuse of the process leaves the
pursuer liable for harm caused by the abuse of process.' 9
In determining whether a valid claim of abuse of process
exists, courts have addressed the issue of whether conduct can be
considered if it occurs before the actual issuance of the criminal or
civil process.20 Courts usually permit all of the defendant's con-
duct to be considered, whether it occurred before or after the
actual legal process began, as long as the process results from an
improper motive.2' An improper demand for collateral advantage
made before actual process has been issued has been seen as
actionable if process follows from the demand. This is because an
improper motive can be derived from words spoken about the
process, and the improper threat itself means the process was
15. Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 751, 754-57.(N.D. 1989).
16. Id. at 753, 757.
17. See, e.g., Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 751 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 682 (1976). Abuse of process usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral
advantage, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, which is improper
in the normal legal proceeding. Id. (citing W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 121, at 898 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]).
18. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17, at 897. Abuse of process differs from
malicious prosecution in that in abuse of process, the claim itself is justified but the process
is misused for an altogether improper motive. With malicious prosecution, the claim itself
is unjustified from the beginning. Id.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1976).
20. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, -, 153 S.E.2d 693, 696
(1967).
21. Id. See also Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, __, 651 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1982). The Nienstedt court stated that " 'process' as used in the tort 'abuse of process'
is not restricted to the narrow sense of that term. Rather, it has been interpreted broadly,
and encompasses the entire range of procedures incident to the litigation process." Id.
(footnote omitted). But see Herring v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, -,
321 A.2d 182, 191 (1974) (citing Earl v. Winne, 14 NJ. 119, 135, 101 A.2d 535, 544 (1953)
(the court concluded that abuse of process action only lies for improper use of process after
process has been issued).
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being used, even though an actual complaint had not been filed.22
One of the essential elements of the tort of abuse of process is
an ulterior purpose designed to achieve an end not lawfully war-
ranted by use of the legal process.2 3 If the ultimate purpose truth-
fully sought by the party is one that the law was not intended to
effect, the result is a form of extortion. 24 Improper purposes have
been found in a variety of contexts. 25 A common example is when
a creditor attaches property worth several times more than the
debt owed, and the court finds an ulterior purpose of pressuring
payment.2 6
22. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17, at 898. The judicial process must
somehow be involved for a successful claim of abuse of process. Id. A mere threat that
process will be issued, without the showing of an improper objective behind the threat, is
insufficient. Id.
23. See, e.g., Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, _, 153 S.E.2d 693,
695 (1967) (store manager used criminal process for the ulterior purpose of making Huggins
pay excessive amounts for merchandise taken, rather than for punishment for shoplifting).
24. Id. at -, 153 S.E.2d at 696. See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17, at 898.
In abuse of process, a form of extortion takes place during the negotiations process rather
than in the issuance of the process itself. Id. The coercion or compulsion during the
"course of negotiation" is what is important, rather than the actual use of legal procedure.
Id.
25. See Moore v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 368 Mich. 71, -., 117 N.W.2d 105, 106 (1962).
In Moore, the Bank instituted criminal proceedings against Moore for allegedly submitting
false financial statements to procure a loan. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court determined
that improper use of criminal process as a means of collecting a private debt might have
been abusive enough to constitute an actionable tort, but the three-year statute of
limitations barred recovery. Id. See, e.g., Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C.
206, -, 153 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1967) (a retail store was found to have the improper purpose of
collecting $10 from Huggins by issuing criminal process for merchandise the store manager
felt Huggins had taken on previous days); Nevada Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. v. Williams, 88
Nev. 601, -, 503 P.2d 9, 13 (1972) (property worth over $30,000 was attached to collect a
debt of less than $5,000 to pressure payment rather than secure a debt); Italian Star Line v.
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1931)
(attorney's issuance of receivership proceedings against company president was really
aimed at gaining access to private company records to pursue contemplated criminal
proceedings).
26. See Blair v. Maxbass Security Bank, 44 N.D. 12, 176 N.W. 98 (1919). In Blair, the
Bank foreclosed chattels valued at more than four times what was actually owed. Id. at -,
176 N.W. at 99. The Bank failed to adequately take care of the livestock and failed to sell
the crops that were seized. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the Bank
actually sought to cause great financial loss for Blair rather than to collect on the debt owed
to the Bank. Id. See also Williams, 88 Nev. at -, 503 P.2d at 13. In Williams, property
valued at over $30,000 was attached as security for a debt of less than $5,000. Id. The
defendant was deemed to have possessed full knowledge that attachment of Williams'
mining equipment would have a devastating effect upon his mining operation. Id. The
court reasoned the attachment was to pressure payment rather than to secure a debt. Id.
However, for a proper purpose, see Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21, -, 521 P.2d 964,
969 (1974). In Fite, Betty J. Fite was awarded a total judgment of $131,800 in a divorce
decree. Her ex-husband, Leslie Fite, was to deposit Chevrolet dealership stock with the
clerk of court as security. Id. Leslie Fite failed to deposit the stock. Id. Consequently,
writs of garnishment were filed which the lower court ordered effective unless sufficient
bond was posted. Id. Fite claimed that the amount of assets garnished was grossly excessive
and that the improper purpose behind the garnishment was to discourage the appeal and to
obtain a favorable negotiating position on the issue of interlocutory support. Id. at 970.
The court disagreed that an improper purpose existed; rather, the court found a valid
garnishment of assets arising from a correct judicially determined process that was
allowable under statute. Id. The Washington Appellate Court ruled that no improper
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An improper purpose was found when a store manager
coerced a customer into paying for merchandise the manager felt
the customer had previously taken. In Huggins v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc., the manager demanded $10 when he discov-
ered a customer had taken two packages of boiled ham worth fifty-
nine cents apiece. When the customer resisted, the manager had
him arrested for petit larceny.28 The court reasoned that the man-
ager had acted to collect on an account rather than to bring a sus-
pected shoplifter to justice. 29 Therefore, the court determined
that the manager had improperly used the criminal process for an
ulterior purpose.3 °
Improper purpose alone is insufficient for a claim of abuse of
process; a willful act not contemplated by the usual form of pro-
cess is also required." In Nevada Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. v.
Williams,3 2 the Nevada Supreme Court determined that Nevada
Credit Bureau's attachment of Williams' equipment and subse-
quent refusal to release the equipment amounted to a willful act
not proper in the normal proceeding.3 The mining equipment
attached was worth more than six times the debt.34 The court con-
cluded that the credit bureau should have known the devastating
effect attachment would have upon Williams' operation.35 The
definite willful acts of attachment and the subsequent refusal to
release showed more than mere bad purpose or bad intent.36 The
purpose exists when the trial court sanctions process in an exercise of its statutory authority,
when the process is neither excessive in amount nor coercive in nature, and when that
process is not improperly alien to the proceedings. Id. The defendant lawyer, Lee, was
simply using the statutorily correct process towards a justifiable ends-to secure payment of
a valid divorce decree. Id.
27. 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967).
28. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967).
29. Id. at -, 153 S.E.2d at 695.
30. Id. In Huggins, the court felt that the store could not divorce itself from
responsibility for the proceedings that flowed from the store manager's actions. Id. at -,
153 S.E.2d at 696. The court found valid the inference that the arrest and charge of petit
larceny plus the subsequent arrest, indictment and trial on the charge of shoplifting for only
two packages of ham were tainted throughout with the ulterior and improper purpose of
forcing Huggins to pay for merchandise that the store manager only "felt" Huggins had
previously taken. Id. When civil or criminal process is used to reach an end not
legitimately within the scope of the process (in this case coercion to pay rather than proper
punishment for a crime), then an action will lie for an abuse of process. Id.
31. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17, at 898. There must be some form of overt
act or definite undertaking aimed at an improper objective. Id.
32. 88 Nev. 601, 503 P.2d 9 (1972).
33. Nevada Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. v. Williams, 88 Nev. 601, __, 503 P.2d 9, 13
(1972).
34. Id. In Williams, the large amount levied, in comparison to the debt, made it
impossible for Williams to use his equipment, causing compensable damage. Id.
35. Id. The Williams court concluded that the combined actions taken by the credit
bureau showed that malice existed, making the award of punitive damages appropriate.
Id. at -, 503 P.2d at 15.
36. See id. The concrete act taken by the credit bureau apparently was sufficient, in
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
acts amounted to definite undertakings by the credit bureau
aimed at harming Williams, an objective that was altogether differ-
ent from the mere satisfaction of the debt.3 7
No liability will be found, however, where the ultimate aim of
the defendant was merely to carry out the process to its legitimate
conclusion, whether the process was successful or not.38 In Thorn-
ton v. Rhoden,3 9 the California Court of Appeals held that merely
taking a deposition in a claim in which one of the founders of a
large corporation was seeking vast sums of money and stock alleg-
edly owed him was not an improper act.40 The suing founder
Steele, through his attorney, deposed a party who made damaging
comments about Thornton.4' These comments caused Thornton to
file a defamation suit and, later, an abuse of process claim.4" The
court held that the taking of ordinary steps in the filing of a deposi-
tion showed no definite willful act aimed at an improper objective;
Steele was merely taking ordinary, authorized steps to carry out
legal process to its authorized conclusion.43
Some courts also require the plaintiff to have suffered damage
in order to succeed in an abuse of process claim.44 One court
found that no damage resulted when a company instigated a
receivership proceeding to collect on an unpaid bill, even though
an ulterior purpose for the receivership existed.45 The court found
that the plaintiff had not stated a cause of action for abuse of pro-
cess, because the seizure of the private papers was not shown to
have caused any detriment.46 In contrast, some authority states
the court's analysis, to show more than bad purpose. Id. The bad purpose was furthered
through the definite act of attachment. Id.
37. Id. See also Blair v. Maxbass Sec. Bank, 44 N.D. 12, -, 176 N.W. 98, 100 (N.D.
1919). In Blair, the fact that the chattel mortgages foreclosed by the bank were worth more
than four times the amount owed on the debt and stopped the operations of Blair's farm,
showed that the definite act of foreclosure was in furtherance of the improper objective of
harming Blair and amounted to more than mere bad purpose alone. Id.
38. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17, at 898.
39. 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966).
40. Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, -, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 720 (1966). The
court in Thornton felt that the taking of a deposition was an act that was authorized by the
civil process in the defamation suit. Id.
41. Id. at -. 53 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
42. Id.
43. Id. at __ 53 Cal. Rptr. at 720. Apparently, the Thornton court felt more was
needed to show the furtherance of an improper purpose than the mere deposition of a
party. Id.
44. Italian Star Line v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F.2d
359, 362 (2d Cir. 1931).
45. Id. The real purpose behind the receivership in Italian Star Line was to gain
access to company records for a possible criminal prosecution. Id. When the attorneys did,
in fact, gain access, no damage to the corporation was shown as a result. Id.
46. Id. (citing Silverman v. Ufa E. Div. Distribution, Inc., 236 N.Y.S. 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1929) (no arrest or seizure of property was made; the only inconvenience or damage
546 [Vol. 67:541
CASE COMMENT
that damages may be awarded without a showing of specific harm;
rather, that damages may be awarded to sustain the integrity of
the judicial system.4 7
When the elements of the claim for abuse of process have
been satisfied, the court must then determine the appropriate
damages. 48 In Dahlen v. Landis,49 an assault and battery case, the
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the amount of
compensatory damages need not be decided by precise mathemat-
ical calculation; rather, the analysis depends on a case-by-case
determination that gives deference to the common sense of the
jury.50 The court found that along with physical harm suffered,
the jury could consider feelings of the harmed party, such as
mental pain, humiliation, and disgrace, in the determination of
compensatory damages.-' Thus, when determining appropriate
compensatory damages, the court allows the jury to take into
account all harm suffered by the plaintiff.52
In certain cases, exemplary damages may be awarded. 3
Exemplary damages act to punish the wrongdoer and to deter sim-
ilar conduct by the wrongdoer and others.5 4 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has noted that an amount sufficient to punish one
wrongdoer may be wholly inadequate to punish or deter
another.5 5 Therefore, evidence of the financial standing of the
defendant is properly considered in determining an appropriate
punishment.5 6 The important inquiry when reviewing the appro-
priateness of an award is whether the amount is so large as to
clearly indicate "passion or prejudice" on the part of the jury.5 7
suffered was that due to an orderly and regular prosecution of a suit); Garland v. Wilson, 289
Pa. 272, 137 A. 26 (1927) (if a person is not arrested and his property is not seized, it is
unimportant how futile the proceedings were)).
47. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17, at 900.
48. Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 755 (N.D. 1989).
49. 314 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1981).
50. Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 68 (N.D. 1981) (citing Lake v. Neubauer, 87
N.W.2d 888, 891 (N.D. 1958)).
51. Id. Dahlen was awarded $20,000 in general damages (for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, embarrassment, and humiliation) and $45,000 in punitive damages, because
of a physical beating Dahlen endured at the hands of Landis. Id.
52. See generally Olmstead v. First Interstate Bank, 449 N.W.2d 804, 808 (N.D. 1989)
(the defendant must compensate the victim for the full extent of the aggravation); Johnson
v. Monsanto Co., 303 N.W.2d 86, 92 (N.D. 1981)(the measure of damages is the amount that
will compensate the plaintiff for all of the detriment proximately caused by the injury);
Unruh v. Murray, 84 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (N.D. 1957) (measure of plaintiff's damages is the
detriment suffered by him due to defendant's unlawful act).
53. Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 68.
54. id.
55. Id. (citing Neidhardt v. Siverts, 103 N.W.2d 97, 103 (N.D. 1960)).
56. Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 68 (citing 6 AM. JUR. 2D, Assault and Battery § 187 (1967)).
57. Neidhardt v. Siverts, 103 N.W.2d 97, 103 (N.D, 1960) (quoting Bogue v. Gunderson,
30 S.D. 1, -, 137 N.W. 595, 596 (1912)).
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The jury must find oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or pre-
sumed, to support an award of exemplary damages. 58 In Dahlen v.
Landis, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the
law does not require direct evidence of a malicious mental state of
a defendant; rather, the motive and circumstances of the act itself
may be examined to determine what influenced the defendant.5 9
If the motive is found to be deceitful and incorrect after a consid-
eration of all the elements, then the jury is authorized to find
malice.60
Allowing jury determination of exemplary damage awards has
been attacked on the grounds that it violates the excessive fines
clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.61 In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,62 the.
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
civil jury award of punitive or exemplary damages violates the
eighth amendment protection against excessive fines.63 The Court
noted that the eighth amendment was primarily influenced by the
Magna Carta and by the English Bill of Rights, which was intended
to prevent the King from imposing arbitrary fines upon his ene-
mies.64 The Court concluded that history supported an interpreta-
tion of the excessive fines clause as a limitation on the ability of a
sovereign king or government to use its prosecutorial power,
58. John Deere Co. v. Nygaard Equip., Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80, 95 (N.D. 1974). North
Dakota Century Code section 32-03-07 provides that the jury may award exemplary
damages upon finding a defendant guilty of "oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or
presumed .. " N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976 & Supp. 1991). Section 32-03-07 has
been "suspended" by the North Dakota Legislature from July 8, 1987 through June 30,
1993. See supra note 14 (North Dakota Legislature added a clear and convincing standard
for evidence to be sufficient to award exemplary damages).
59. Dahlen, 314 N.W.2d at 69 (citing Neidhardt v. Siverts, 103 N.W.2d 97, 102 (N.D.
1960)). The circumstances surrounding Landis' assault and battery of Dahlen (the
suddenness of the attack along with the profanity and repeated blows) permitted the jury to
find that Landis acted maliciously. Id.
60. id.
61. See Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989)
(eighth amendment is not applicable to civil cases; rather, the amendment is only
considered in criminal contexts). Opinion does exist to the contrary. See Jeffries, A
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986)
[hereinafter Jeffries]; Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (1987). The Magna Carta
established a general principal that the punishment must be in proportion to the offense.
Id. at 1716-18. Further, the Magna Carta specifically included civilly assessed sanctions
(amercements) within the scope of its prohibition of disproportionate punishments. Id. The
eighth amendment excessive fines clause was based on the English Bill of Rights, which, in
turn, was based on the Magna Carta. id. The clause's roots evince the broader principle
that punishment in any form must be proportionate to the misconduct. Id.
62. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
63. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989). The
eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
64. Id. (citing L. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 91 (1981).
548
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including the power to collect fines, for improper ends.65 The
Court reasoned that the "Excessive Fines Clause was intended to
limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the gov-
ernment. ' 66 Therefore, the Court held that the eighth amend-
ment prohibition against excessive fines "does not apply to awards
of punitive damages in cases between private parties."6
Another argument is that statutes allowing juries discretion in
determining exemplary damage awards are vague and arbitrary,
thus denying a defendant due process and equal protection under
the United States Constitution.6" Much support exists for the argu-
ment that the due process clause forbids statutes that lack objec-
tive guidelines by which juries should properly set the amount of
exemplary damages.69 In Browning-Ferris, Justice Brennan, in a
special concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, expressed
concern over the absence of standards and guidelines for the jury
to act upon in setting the amount of exemplary damages.7 ° Justice
Brennan felt that the touchstone of due process was the protection
of the individual against arbitrary government action, and that
without statutory guidelines for the determination of appropriate-
ness of exemplary damages, such arbitrary determinations would
violate due process.7 ' He felt that damage awards situated within
an acceptable range for the stated offense, deliberated and agreed
upon by legislatures, would be less arbitrary than awards deter-
65. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 271-72.
66. Id. at 268.
67. Id. at 260. The Court followed precedent and held that the eighth amendment is
only applicable to criminal process or actions by the government. Id.
68. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1573, 1578 (D. Wyo. 1989)
(The jury must consider the nature of the tort, the amount of actual damages, and the
wealth of the defendant in determining appropriate punitive damages. Therefore,
Wyoming law contains adequate standards.); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp.
1517, 1536 (D. Minn. 1989) (The Minnesota punitive damages statute was held not to give
juries unbridled discretion in awarding punitive damages. First, the court has a duty to
grant a new trial upon a finding of punitive damages unsupported by the evidence. Second,
the statute lists nine separate factors which the jury should consider.); Radell v. Comora,
211 Cal. App. 3d 1244, -, 259 Cal. Rptr. 891,900 (Ct. App. 1989) (statute defining conduct
giving rise to liability for punitive damages is not unconstitutionally vague).
69. See Jeffries, supra note 61, at 139. Professor Jeffries proposes that the due process
clause requires, in whatever context, that legal procedures be consistent with "fundamental
fairness" and with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 152
(quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Service, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). Under this premise, "fundamental fairness"
requires that a state not allow unlimited punitive recovery in tort situations, since a
potential defendant would not have any warning of the potential consequences of his
actions. Jeffries, supra note 61 at, 152.
70. Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280-81 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring specially). Justice Brennan felt that without statutory guidelines,
juries are left on their own to make this important and potentially devastating decision. Id.
71. Id. In Browning-Ferris, the jury was sent to deliberations with instructions stating
only that they should consider the character of the defendants, the defendant's financial
standing, and the nature of the defendant's acts. Id.
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mined by juries with only "skeletal guidance. 72
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award. In
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,73 the Court held that
punitive damage awards that do not lack objective criteria are not
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 4
The Court noted that the common law method of allowing juries
to assess punitive damages was well established before the four-
teenth amendment was adopted and refused to draw any "mathe-
matical bright line" to determine acceptable punitive awards.75
The Court reasoned that the jury instructions afforded no more
discretion than is allowed with other familiar concepts of the law,
such as "'the best interests of the child," ''reasonable care," or "due
diligence. "76
In Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc.,7 7 the North Dakota Supreme
Court examined the elements of an abuse of process claim and the
constitutionality of a North Dakota statute pertaining to awards of
exemplary damages. 78 The court determined that after terminat-
ing Stoner's employment for accepting premiums offered by ven-
dors, Nash Finch had improperly used criminal process to obtain
repayment of the value of the premiums and repayment of a mort-
gage.79  The court reasoned that Nash Finch executives
threatened issuance of a felony criminal complaint for the ulterior
purpose of obtaining repayment of monies owed the company, a
wilful act of using process in furtherance of an improper objec-
tive.8 0 Using the criminal process to obtain a collateral advantage
over Stoner was the outcome of the legal claim rather than the
purpose for which criminal process was intended-punishment for
theft.8 '
Further, the court found unpersuasive Nash Finch's argument
that the jury could only consider conduct of Nash Finch officials
72. Id. See also Bankers Life and Casualty v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, was concerned that a
Mississippi statute was vague in that it failed to give warning to a potential tortfeasor that
actual damages of $20,000 could cause a punitive damage award of $1.6 million. Id.
73. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
74. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1044.
77. Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1989).
78. Id. at 751-57.
79. Id. at 751-52.
80. Id.
81. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 751-52. In effect, the court concluded that Nash Finch had
pursued a scheme to extort money from Stoner through the use of the criminal process. Id.
at 754.
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which occurred after the date the criminal complaint was filed.8 2
The court reasoned that Nash Finch's conduct prior to the issu-
ance of the complaint was essential to determine Nash Finch's true
goal and concluded that Nash Finch's restrictive interpretation of
the proper time for considering its conduct was unwarranted.8 3
Apparently, the court has determined that an expansive reading of
the willful act requirement is appropriate. Under such a reading,
any conduct which occurs before the issuance of legal process and
which shows an improper motive in using the legal process may be
taken under consideration.8 4
In determining the existence of malice required for exem-
plary damages, the court followed Dahlen v. Landis. 5 The court
concluded that circumstances showed that Nash Finch had, in
effect, schemed to extort money from Stoner through the use of
the criminal process, and that by doing so, Nash Finch was mali-
cious in its actions. 8 The award of exemplary damages was, there-
fore, appropriate.8 7
Regarding the constitutionality of the $200,000 exemplary
award, the North Dakota Supreme Court found no violation of the
excessive fines, due process, or equal protection clauses.8 8 The
court followed Browning-Ferris Industries9 and deemed the
excessive fines clause only applicable to the criminal process. 90
Regarding the vagueness claim made by Nash Finch, the court'dis-
agreed with Nash Finch's assertions that the jury determination of
the appropriate exemplary damages was arbitrary and standard-
less.9 ' The court reasoned that the statutory terms required by
82. Id. at 752. The criminal complaint was filed on December 18, 1985. Id.
83. Id. The Stoner court determined that a demand for a collateral advantage which
occurred before the issuance of process was sufficient to satisfy the definite wilful act
requirement. Id. (citing PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 17).
84. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 752.
85. Id. at 754 (applying Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 69 (N.D. 1981)). The
Dahlen court declared that the law does not require the direct evidence of a malicious
mental state; rather, "the character of the act itself, with all its surrounding facts and
circumstances, may be inquired into for the purpose of ascertaining" the true desire or
motive. Dahlen, 314 N.W. 2d at 69. Once the character of the act has been determined, if
the motive is found to be improper, the law authorizes the jury to find it was malicious. Id.
86. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 754.
87. Id. The Stoner court also found no prejudice or passion on the part of the jury in
making its determination, since the jury properly considered Nash Finch's wealth in
considering an appropriate award of damages which would serve as punishment. ld. The
fact that Nash Finch was a large corporation with gross revenue of $1.3 billion and net
profit of $12 million for the fiscal year 1985 made the $200,000 award reasonable, in light of
Nash Finch's conduct. Id.
88. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 754-55.
89. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
90. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 755.
91. Id. The Stoner court stated that the due process clause requires definiteness of
language, so that the language will provide adequate warning of the conduct proscribed
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North Dakota Century Code section 32-03-07, "oppression, fraud,
or malice," were sufficiently clear to allow persons of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable guide and were capable of consistent
application.92 Further, the court reasoned that the jury instruc-
tions gave adequate standards to guide the deliberations by requir-
ing clear and convincing proof of oppression or malice for a
determination of exemplary damages.93 Lastly, the court found
that the availability of motions for a new trial and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict also acted to limit the jury's discretion
by preventing unfair awards of punitive damages.94
By upholding the constitutionality of North Dakota's exem-
plary damages statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
deferred to the jury's ability to contemplate the proper size and
severity of an award.95 The implication of this deferential stance is
that the court has more confidence in individuals' ability to con-
template appropriate punitive damages in civil actions than it has
in predetermined legislative standards and, as a result, large
awards may follow from the finding of a malicious tort.
L. Patrick O'Day
and will make the boundaries sufficiently distinct to allow judges and juries to fairly
administer the law. Id. (citing State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317, 319 (N.D. 1988)).
92. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 756. In Stoner, the court stated that a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague merely because it does not specify conduct by which the statute is
violated. Id. at 755 (citing State v. Beyer, 441 N.W.2d 919, 921 (N.D. 1989)). Justice Levine,
in dissent, felt from reading the separate opinions in Browning-Ferris and Bankers Life and
Casualty, that a majority of the court would find the absence of standards unfair and
contrary to the due process clause. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 758-60 (Levine, J., dissenting)
(citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Bankers Life and
Casualty v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988)). Justice Levine felt North Dakota juries are left
completely to their own discretion without any objective standards to guide their
determination, thus causing juries' decisions to be unduly influenced by passion and
prejudice. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 760. Justice Levine saw the failure to instruct the jury on
the economic position of Nash Finch and on the "nature" of Nash Finch's actions as a total
lack of guidance, allowing the jury to do what it merely thought would be "best." Id. at
759.
93. Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 756 n.7.
94. Id. at 757.
95. Id. at 759 (Levine, J., dissenting).
